Locke
The State of Nature, and the State of War, which however some Men have confounded(混淆),are as far distant as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity(敌意), Malice(憎恨), Violence, and Mutual Destructionare from one another.
(John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, s.19, p. 280)
自然状态一定会变为战争状态？洛克说，我看未必。
It is a matter of scholarly debate whether Locke had Hobbes explicitly in mind when he wrote this passage(published in 1689). His official target was the view of Sir Robert Filmer(1588-1653), a defender of the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings—that the king ruled with authority granted by God. Nevertheless it is hard to deny that,at a number of points, Locke seems to be arguing with Hobbes, whose work must have been well known to him. As we shall see, comparing the two accounts of the state of nature casts light on them both.
学术上，洛克主要对抗的是Filmer的“君权神授”学说，但他一定也读过霍布斯的论著。
While,as we saw, Hobbes identified the state of nature with a state of war, Locke is keen to emphasize that this is a mistake. Locke supposed that it would generally be possible to live an acceptable life even in the absence of government. Our question must be how Locke managed to draw this conclusion. Or,in other words, how, according to Locke, does Hobbes fall into error?
他一再强调霍布斯的结论是错误的。
Let us start at the beginning. The state of nature, says Locke, is first, a state of perfect freedom; second, a state of equality; and third, bound by a Law of Nature. Verbally, of course, this sounds just like Hobbes's view, but each of these three elements is given quite a different interpretation by Locke.Hobbes's principle of equality was a claim about the mental and physical capabilities of all people. For Locke it is a moral claim about rights: no person has a natural right to subordinate any other. This assertion was explicitly aimed against those, including Filmer, who accepted the feudal(封建的) view of a natural hierarchy, headed by a sovereign, ruling by divine appointment. Filmer argued that God had appointed Adam first sovereign, and contemporary sovereigns can trace their title back to God's initial grant. For Locke it is self-evident that no one naturally has a right to rule, in the sense that no one has been appointed by God for this purpose. Although Hobbes did not mean this by his assumption of equality, he would accept Locke's position here. Hobbes thought that whoever did, in fact, exercise power over the community was, for that reason, to be recognized as its sovereign.
两人前提一致，但内涵不同。洛克更强调道德律下行为的合规，所指平等，即我们一般意义上的生而平等。
There is, however, greater disagreement between the two on the nature and content of the Law of Nature. For Hobbes the fundamental Law of Nature was to seek peace,if others are doing so, but otherwise to use the advantages of war. This, and Hobbes's other eighteen Laws, were said to be 'theorems of reason'. Locke, too,believes the Law of Nature to be discoverable by reason, but Locke's Law has a theological aspect absent in Hobbes's Laws. The Law, says Locke, is that no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. The reason for this, according to Locke, is that while we have no natural superiors on earth, we do have one in heaven. In other words, we are all creatures of God,his property, put on earth as his servants, 'made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure'. Therefore 'Every one.. .is bound to preserve himself] and not to quit his station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preservethe rest of Mankind' (Second Treatise, s. 6, p. 271). The Law of Nature, for Locke, is simply the idea that mankind is to be preserved as much as possible.So, Locke argues, we have a clear duty not to harm others in the state of nature (except for limited purposes of self-defence), and we even have a duty to help them if we can do so without damage to ourselves.
看得出，洛克人品很好，思想纯正。
Clearly,then, Hobbes and Locke have significantly different views of the nature and content of the Laws of Nature. A still greater difference lies in their use of the term 'natural liberty'. For Hobbes, we saw, to say that we have natural liberty is to say that it can often be entirely rational, and beyond moral criticism, to do whatever is appropriate to help secure our own survival, even if this means attacking the innocent. Locke's understanding is very different,claiming that although the state of nature 'be a state of Liberty, yet it is not a state of Licence . . . The state of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one' (Second Treatise, s. 6, pp. 270-1).
关于天赋自由的定义，二者也有不同，洛克认为个人自由不应损害他人权益。
Thus natural liberty, on Locke's view, is no more than the liberty to do what the Law of Nature allows. That is, we are given the liberty to do only what is morally permitted. So, for example, although Locke's Law of Nature prevents me from invading the property of others, this is in no sense a limitation of my liberty. Locke would certainly disagree with Hobbes's claim that in the state of nature everyone has a right to everything, even each others' bodies(although he does accept that we have considerable rights of self-defence).
在洛克的体系下，人的行为全靠自觉。
Do these disagreements between Hobbes and Locke add up to enough to establish Locke's conclusion that the state of nature need not be a state of war? Clearly it is important for Locke that even in the state of nature we have a moral duty to restrict our behaviour. Yet this, on its own, does not seem enough to show that in the state of nature fear and suspicion would not exist. And, as Hobbes argues, fear and suspicion may be enough for the state of nature to tumble into war. To avoid this Locke requires not only that the state of nature be subject to moral assessment, but that somehow or other people will be motivated to act as the Law of Nature instructs.
但道德律无法消除我们内心的恐惧与猜疑。
This suggests a strategy for resisting Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion. Hobbes argued that human beings would be driven by the search for felicity (the continued satisfaction of their desires), and this, at least initially, leads them into conflict. If Hobbes has misdescribed human motivation—if human beings, say, really are strongly altruistic(利他的)—then peace might easily be achieved. This would be one route to Locke's conclusion. Is it the route Locke takes? Locke does not explicitly put forward a theory of human motivation in the Two Treatises, but it seems clear that he did not think that human beings would automatically be motivated to follow the moral law. Indeed he comes very close to sounding like Hobbes: 'For the Law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern Men in this World, be in vain, if there were no body that in the State of Nature, had a Power to Execute the Law and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders' (Second Treatise, s. 7, p. 271). In other words, the Law of Nature, like all laws, needs a law-enforcer. Without such an enforcer it would be empty.
结论却与霍布斯相似，我们需要一个管理者。
Hobbes is perfectly prepared to accept that in the state of nature his Laws of Nature are ineffective. Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke cannot accept that the Law of Nature could be in vain: it is, after all, in Locke's view the law of God, who presumably does nothing in vain. Therefore there must be a way of enforcing the law: somebody who has the power to enforce it. But we are all equal in the state of nature, so if anyone has such power then everyone must have it.Therefore, Locke concludes, there must be a natural right, held by each person,to punish those who offend against the Law of Nature. Each of us has the right to punish those who harm another's life, liberty, or property.
但洛克认为应该由所有人共同担任法律制裁的角色（同样是因为众生平等）。
The right to punish is not the same thing as the right of self-defence. It is the right not simply to try to prevent or ward off a particular episode of harm or damage, but to make anyone who has overstepped the Law of Nature pay for their transgression(罪). This 'strange doctrine' as Locke calls it, plays a very important role in the derivation of his view of the state of nature. If the Law of Nature can be enforced, then we have good reason to hope that life could be relatively peaceful. Offenders can be punished to make reparation, and to restrain and deter(阻止) them, and others, from similar acts in the future: 'Each Transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much Severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the Offender, give him cause to repent(悔改),and terrifie others from doing the like' (Second Treatise, s. 12, p. 275). It is important that this natural right to punish is not restricted solely to the individual who suffers the wrong. If that were so, then obviously those who commit murders would go unpunished. But, more importantly, the victim may not have sufficient strength or power to subdue(镇压), and exact(强迫) retribution(惩罚) from, the offender. Locke therefore argues that those who break the law are a threat to us all, as they will tend to undermine our peace and safety, and so every person in the state of nature is given what Locke calls the 'Executive Power of the Law of Nature'. Locke has in mind the idea that law-abiding citizens,outraged(受欺凌) by the offence, will band together with the victim to bring the villain to justice, and together they will have the necessary power to do this.
大家团结一致，打倒坏人。
Locke realizes that the claim that we all have a natural right to punish offenders may seem surprising. However, in support of his view he claims that, without it,it is hard to see how the sovereign of any state can have the right to punish an alien who has not consented to the laws. If the foreigner has not consented to the sovereign's laws, then he has not accepted that he is liable to punishment for breaching them. Therefore such a person cannot justly be punished, unless there is some sort of natural right to punish. In effect, the sovereign is in the state of nature with the alien, and so the sovereign's behaviour is sanctioned not by the laws of the land, but by the Executive Power of the Law of Nature.
这段话可以跳过。
If the Law of Nature is enforceable, then a number of other rights can be secured,even in the state of nature. For Locke, the most important of these is the right to private property. We can already see what the basic form of the argument must be. God put us on earth, and it would be absurd to think that he put us here to starve. But we will starve unless we can rightfully consume objects such as apples and acorns; furthermore, we will do better still if individuals can securely possess plots of land and rightfully exclude others.For then we can cultivate the land, and be secure in our enjoyment of its products.
私人产权意识被再次加强。
To the modern reader, Locke's continual invocation(祈求) of God and God's purposes may seem an embarrassment. Surely it should be possible to consider questions of political philosophy outside a theological framework? However, Locke also appeals to 'natural reason' in establishing the premisses of his arguments,even if he gives it a lesser role. So, for example, he thinks it absurd, and against natural reason, to suppose that human beings may not make use of the earth without the permission of all others, for if this were the case we should starve. This alternative argument certainly seems plausible(好像有道理), and so some followers of Locke have been prepared to drop the theological underpinnings of his view in favour of this 'natural reason' approach.
天然理性的影响在洛克的论证中不被那么重视。
To return to the main argument, so far the central difference between Hobbes and Locke seems to be that Locke thinks that, even in the state of nature, there is an enforceable and effective moral law, backed by the natural right of punishment, while Hobbes would be highly sceptical of this claim. We can imagine how Hobbes would reply to Locke. According to Hobbes, the only way of subduing any power is through the exercise of a greater power. So we might all gang up on a villain to exact reparation and deter future such acts. But then the villain—who may well be an unreasonable person with like-minded friends—might return, armed, with forces united, to gain revenge. Such thoughts could act as a powerful disincentive to those thinking of exercising their executive power of the law of nature. If you want to avoid unpleasantness in the future, don't get involved now. So Hobbes would probably argue that even if people did have a natural right to punish offenders, this would rarely be used with any effect unless a single, stable, authority existed: for example, within a tribe or group an acknowledged leader to adjudicate(判决) disputes and enforce judgements. But that would already be a fledgling(新生的) state. So in the state of nature, even if there were a right to punish, this would be ineffective as a means to peace.
However,there is still one seemingly vital difference between Hobbes and Locke that I have not yet mentioned. Remember that for Hobbes, one of the key factors that brought people into conflict was a natural scarcity of goods. Two people will often desire the same thing, and this will make them enemies. Locke, on the other hand, appears to make a very different assumption: nature has giventhings richly. There is a natural abundance of land, and plenty of room for everyone, particularly 'in the first Ages of the World, when Men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their Company, in the then vast Wildernessof the Earth, than to be straitned(穷困) for want of room to plant in' (SecondTreatise, s. 36, p. 293). Hence, Locke implies, under these conditions there is very little reason for conflict and dispute. Most people, presumably, wouldrather cultivate their own plot than invade their neighbour's, and so we can expect a relatively peaceful climate and few sources of quarrel. If this is right, then peace in the state of nature is secured not only by the natural right to punish, but, equally importantly, by the fact that it would rarely have to be used.
洛克不认为土地资源是有限的，所以大家可以不打架。
How plausible is this? Hobbes no doubt would point out that abundance of land does not rule out scarcity of finished and consumable goods. It will often be farless trouble to take another's product by stealth(密谋), than to go to the effort of ploughing, sowing, and harvesting. Furthermore, if others have similar thoughts then I am wasting my energy by cultivating my own land, for, as Hobbes argued,whatever I will produce will end up in the hands of others. For Locke to refute(反驳) this he must either show that the natural right to punish can be used effectively, or that human beings have some fairly strong motivation to obey the moral law. Otherwise a few highly anti-social individuals could ruin things for everyone.
霍布斯又说了，有的人懒惰，会选择去抢掠他人成果，洛克对此并未否认。
Locke,indeed, comes close to admitting that the state of nature may not be as peaceful as he first supposed. After all, he has to be careful not to paint itin too idyllic tones, for then it would be very difficult to explain why we ever left it and created the state. The primary fault, Locke sees, is with the administration of justice. It is not so much that we will squabble over goods,but that we will squabble over what justice requires. We will, in other words,disagree about the interpretation of the Law of Nature. People will disagree about whether an offence has taken place. They will disagree about its proper punishment and compensation. And they might not have the power to exact what they believe to be its proper punishment. So the attempt to administer justice,even between the would-be law-abiding(守法), is itself a powerful source of dispute.This Locke sees as the primary 'inconvenience' of the state of nature. The only thing that prevents serious trouble is the thought that, given initia labundance of land, disputes would be few.
啰嗦，啰嗦。
But Locke sees the initial abundance of land eventually turning to scarcity: not through massive population growth, but through greed and the 'invention' of money. Prior to the existence of money no one would have any reason to take more land than is necessary for their own family's survival. If you grew more than you could use, it would simply go to waste, unless you could exchange it for something more permanent. But once money exists then such exchanges become easy, and it is possible to hoard up(积蓄) enormous amounts of money without the risk that it will spoil. This gives people a reason to cultivate more land to produce goods for sale. In turn this leads to pressure on land which then, and for this reason only, thinks Locke, becomes scarce. Now Locke does not say that such scarcity introduces the Hobbesian state of war, but he recognizes that once land is in short supply and under dispute the inconveniences of the state of nature multiply and multiply. It becomes imperative(必要的) to establish civil government. So although it is initially peaceful, eventually, even for Locke,the state of nature becomes almost unbearable.
钱的出现加剧了资源的相对稀缺，自然状态难以为继，洛克最终也认为，我们需要一个政府。（说了大半天，俩人的分歧主要还是在于价值观的不同=。=）
Jean-Jacques Rousseau(28 June 1712 – 2 July 1778)Rousseau
The philosophers, who have inquired into the foundations of society, have all felt the necessity of going back to a state of nature; but not one of them has got there .... Every one of them, in short, constantly dwelling on wants, avidity(贪婪),oppression, desires, and pride, has transferred to the state of nature ideas which were acquired in society; so that, in speaking of the savage, they described the social man.
(Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 50)
研究过社会基础的哲学家们，都认为有追溯到自然状态的必要，但是没有一个人曾经追溯到这种状态。总之，所有这些人不断地在考虑人类的需要、贪婪、压迫、欲望和骄傲的时候，其实是把源自社会的一些观念，搬到自然状态上去了；他们论述的是野蛮人，而描绘的却是文明人。
One way to avoid Hobbes's pessimistic conclusions about the state of nature is to start from different premisses. In particular, life without the state might seem a much more attractive possibility if we adopted a different theory of human nature and motivation.Hobbes argues that people continually seek felicity: the power to satisfy whatever future desires they may have. This, together with fear and suspicion of fellow human beings, in a condition of scarcity, drives the argument for the state of war. But suppose Hobbes was quite wrong. Suppose people naturally and spontaneously(自发地) desire to help each other whenever they can. Perhaps, instead of competing in a struggle for existence, humans offer mutual aid, and act for thesake of each others' comfort. If so, then the state of nature will look very different.
即使是面对霍布斯，也要质疑一下呀。
Although Rousseau does not make these optimistic assumptions about the natural goodness of human beings, his view takes a substantial step in this direction. Like Hobbes and Locke he assumes that human beings are primarily motivated by the desire for self-preservation. Yet he also believes that this is not the end of the story. Hobbes and Locke overlooked a central aspect of human motivation—pity or compassion—and so overestimated the likelihood of conflict in the state of nature. Rousseau believes that we have 'an innate repugnance(反感) at seeing a fellow-creature suffer' (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 73).This, he adds, is 'so natural, that the very brutes themselves sometimes give evident proofs of it'.
卢梭在前人论证的基础上，考虑了怜悯心的影响。
Compassion,argues Rousseau, acts as a powerful restraint on the drives that might lead to attack and war.
It is this compassion that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress: it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place of laws, morals, and virtues, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice: it is this which will always prevent a sturdy(健壮的) savage from robbing a weak child or a feeble(虚弱的) old man of the sustenance they may have with pain and difficulty acquired, if he sees a possibility of providing for himself by other means.
(Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 76)
强盗亦有道。
Russeau does not doubt that if modern citizens, moulded and corrupted by society, were placed in a state of nature, they would act just as Hobbes depicted them. But both Hobbes and Locke have projected the qualities of man-in-society (or even man-in-bourgeois(中产阶级)-society) on to savage man. That is, they have depicted socialized traits as if they were natural.
Rousseau follows this with a second claim. When we understand how 'savage man'behaves—motivated by both self-preservation and pity— the state of nature would be far from the Hobbesian state of war, and even in some respects preferable to a more civilized condition. This does not mean that Rousseau is advocating are turn to the state of nature, for that would be impossible for us, tainted(玷污) and softened by society. Still, for Rousseau, it is something of a matter of regret that we have grown civilized. For Rousseau took an extreme, and extremely dismal(忧郁的), view of human progress. His treatise on education, Emile, begins: 'God makes all things good; man meddles(摆弄) with them and they become evil.' And his early essay, the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, argues that the development of the arts and sciences has done more to corrupt than to purify(净化) morality.
不知道为啥，很多哲学家都对社会进步抱有悲观。
However,it is important to make clear that Rousseau's claim that human beings are naturally motivated by pity or compassion is very different from the point we attributed to Locke in the previous section: that human beings in the state of nature will often respect each other's rights. Like Hobbes, Rousseau argues that notions of law, right, and morality have no place in the state of nature,and so, clearly, he cannot mean that we have a natural impulse to follow a moral law. But unlike Hobbes and Locke he claims that we generally try to avoid harming others, not because we recognize that harm is immoral, but because we have an aversion(反感) to harm, even when it is not our own. We are naturally sympathetic to others, and are upset by their suffering. So we take steps to avoid this if we can.
卢梭对于人性的认识比洛克理性，比霍布斯乐观，即我们之所以不伤害别人，是因为我们对此反感。
It is surely very plausible that by nature human beings often have sympathy for one another. But is this enough to prevent war in the absence of government? The trouble is that Rousseau has given natural man two drives—self-preservation and compassion—and it seems more than possible that the two could come into conflict. If another has what I believe to be essential for my preservation,but I can take it only by causing harm, what would I—or rather the savage—-do? It would surely be rare for any creature to put a stranger's well-being before their own survival, and consequently if goods are scarce the influence of pity must fade. Rousseau more or less admits this. Pity stops the savage robbing the weak or sick, provided there is hope of gaining sustenance elsewhere. But what if there is little or small hope of this? Perhaps, then, in a condition of scarcity we would suffer doubly. Not only would we be in a state of war, but we would feel terrible about all the harm we were doing to our fellow humanbeings. But the main point is that in a condition of scarcity, natural compassion does not seem enough to hold off the threat of war.
即使如此，卢梭的自保和怜悯的两大前提，存在难以缓和的矛盾。
Rousseau tries to avoid this type of problem by supposing that savage man has few desires, and, relative to those desires, goods are more likely to be obtainedby hunting and gathering than by taking them from others. This is not because of nature's munificence(慷慨), but because the savage, claims Rousseau, is a solitary being, rarely coming into contact with others. Indeed there would not even be families. Rousseau speculates that children would leave their mothers as soonas they could survive on their own, and that among savages there would be no permanent union of man and woman. Compassion is not a strong enough sentiment to create a family bond.
孤独的野人，在荒野上唱着歌儿。。。
Part of Rousseau's explanation of the solitary life of the savage is that nature has equipped the savage to survive alone. Strong and fleet of foot, not only a match for wild beasts but generally free from disease (which Rousseau claims to be a consequence of indulgence(嗜好) and unhealthy habits), the savage desires only food, sexual satisfaction, and sleep, and fears only hunger and pain.
卢梭说，野人有三大爱好：吃饭，和谐，睡得饱。他们生活节制，所以不会打架。
Natural solitude rules out any desire for 'glory' or reputation, for the savage takes no interest in others' opinions. Indeed, as Rousseau argues that at this stage the savage has not yet developed language, the opportunities for forming and expressing opinions seem greatly restricted. Equally, the savage has no desire for power. Hobbes, we saw, defined power as 'the present means to satisfy future desires'. But, Rousseau argues, the savage has little foresight, and barely even anticipates future desires, let alone seeking the means to satisfy them. Rousseau likens the savage to the contemporary Caribbean, who, he says,'will improvi- dently(短视的) sell you his cotton bed in the morning, and come crying in the evening to buy it again, not having foreseen he would want it again the next night' (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 62). Consequently all of Hobbes's drives to war—desires for gain, safety and reputation—are either defused(缓和) or absent in Rousseau's state of nature.
在霍布斯那里，祖先们冰雪聪明；在卢梭这儿，在坐的都是弱智。
Still,despite its relatively peaceful character, Rousseau's state of nature hardly seems a welcoming prospect. Rousseau's savage may well be king of the beasts,but nevertheless, as portrayed, seems barely distinguishable from the other wild animals. The savage, says Rousseau, is 'an animal weaker than some, and less agile than others; but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organised of any' (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 52). Given that this is all we would have to boast of in the state of nature, why should Rousseau regret that we have now passed to a more civilized era? Furthermore, it is hard to see how such a transition would even be possible. What dynamic is there for change in Rousseau's picture? It is far from clear how, even hypothetically, we could have got here, from there.
他到底是怎么想的呢？
Rousseau himself admits that what he says is no more than 'probable conjecture', for the transition could have happened in many ways. And it has to be admitted that it is not always easy to fit together everything Rousseau says on this topic.However, the key is the thought that human beings, unlike brutes, have two special attributes: free will, and the capacity for self-improvement. As we shall see, this latter capacity, Rousseau supposes, is the source of all human progress and all human misfortune.
卢梭说：自我改善是人类进步的源泉，也是人类悲剧的开端。
The state of nature as set out so far lies deep in human prehistory: the condition of 'infant man', who spends time 'wandering up and down the forests, without industry, without speech, and without home, an equal stranger to war and to all ties, neither standing in need of his fellow- creatures nor having any desire to hurt them, and perhaps even not distinguishing them one from another'(Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 79). We begin the path to civilization through the first exercise of the capacity of self-improvement: the developmentof tools in the struggle for subsistence, a struggle brought about, Rousseau speculates, by an increase in population. It is interesting that Rousseau sees innovation, and not Hobbesian competition, as the primary response to scarcity.Here Rousseau is probably relying on the idea that, as the savage has a natural aversion to harming others, most will prefer to get what they need by working for it, rather than taking things from others. And it is innovation to make work easier—tool-making—that first awakens man's pride and intelligence.
卢梭认为，面对稀缺，人们会选择创新，而非通过你死我活的竞争，来渡过难关。
Another innovation is the idea of co-operation: mutuality of interest spurs collective pursuits, as for example, in the formation of hunting parties. Thus the advantages of living in groups, and making common huts and shelters, become apparent, and the habit of living in these new conditions 'gave rise to thefinest feelings known to humanity, conjugal(婚姻的) love and paternal affection'(Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 88).
而且，合作的出现使得我们充分发挥了群居的优势。
In this condition another novelty arises: leisure time. Co-operation and tool-making conquer scarcity sufficiently well to give the opportunity to create goods which go beyond bare survival needs. Thus the savage now starts to create convenience or luxury goods, unknown to former generations. However,'This was the first yoke he inadvertently(无意地) imposed on himself, and the first source of the evils he prepared for his descendants'(子孙) (Discourse on the Originof Inequality, 88). Why? Because man now develops what we could call 'corrupted needs'. Rousseau tells a familiar and plausible story. We become dependent on what were at first considered luxuries. Having them gives us little or no pleasure, but losing them is devastating—even though we once managed perfectly well without them. From here a number of other negative elements are introduced: as societies develop, so do languages, and the opportunity for comparison of talents. This gives rise to pride, shame, and envy. For the first time an injury is treated as an affront(侮辱), a sign of contempt rather than simply as damage, and those so injured begin to seek their revenge. As the state of nature begins to transform itself, causes of dissension(分歧) and strife(纠纷) break out.But, even so, Rousseau says of this stage that it must have been the happiest and most stable of epochs, 'the real youth of the world' (Discourse on theOrigin of Inequality, 91): a just mean between the savage's natural indolence(懒惰) and stupidity, and the civilized being's inflamed pride.
剩余产品的出现催生了我们很多新情绪。
Though this is a stable period it can not last for ever, and the real rot sets in with the long and difficult development of agriculture and metallurgy(炼金). From here it is a short step to claims of private property, and rules of justice. But private property leads to mutual dependence, jealousy, inequality, and the slavery of the poor. Eventually:
The destruction of equality was attended by the most terrible disorders.Usurpations(侵占) by the rich, robbery by the poor, and the unbridled(放纵的) passions of both, suppressed the cries of natural compassion and the still feeble voice of justice, and filled man with avarice(贪婪), ambition, and vice. Between the title of the strongest and that of first occupier, there arose perpetual conflicts,which never ended but in battles and bloodshed. The new-born state of society thus gave rise to a horrible state of war. (Discourse on the Origin ofInequality, 97)
因为私人产权导致战争状态。
Thus we arrive at war: not as part of the initial state of innocence but as a result of the creation of the first rudimentary(初步的) societies. And at this point: The richman, thus urged by necessity, conceived at length the profoundest plan that ever entered the mind of man: this was to employ in his favour the forces of those who attacked him' (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 98). This was a plan, of course, to institute social rules of justice to ensure peace: rules that bind all equally, but which are greatly advantageous to the rich, for they, after all, are the ones with property to secure. Thus the first civil societies—societies with laws and governments—are born. And once more we see the emergence of civil society taken to be a response to a situation of war or near-war in the state of nature.
结论类似。
Prince Pyotr Alexeyevich Kropotkin(December 9, 1842 – February 8, 1921)Anarchism
No more laws! No more judges! Liberty, equality and practical human sympathy are the only effective barriers we can oppose to the anti-social instincts of certain among us.
(Peter Kropotkin, Law and Authority (1886), repr. inThe Anarchist Reader, 117)
一直都觉得亲王的态度很强。
Even Rousseau, who believed in man's natural innocence, thought that ultimately life without government would be intolerable. Certain anarchist thinkers, however, have tried to resist this conclusion. William Godwin (1756-1836), husband of Mary Woll stonecraft(1759-97) , differed from Rousseau on two counts. First, human beings, when 'perfected' could become not only non-aggressive but highly co-operative. Second, this preferred state for human beings was not buried in the distant past, but an inevitable future in which the state would no longer be necessary. The Russian anarchist, Peter Kropotkin, held a somewhat similar view that all animal species, including human beings, profited through natural'mutual aid'. This he put forward as an alternative to Darwin's theory of evolution through competition. The fittest, suggests Kropotkin, are those species best able to achieve co-operation.
克鲁泡特金相信人民可以互助合作，建立社会秩序。
Kropotkinwas able to marshal(排出) impressive evidence of co-operation within the animal kingdom, and other anarchists have argued—surely correctly—that there are endless examples of uncoerced(自愿) co-operation among human beings. Many philosophers and social scientists have accepted that even highly selfish agents will tend to evolve patterns of co-operative behaviour, even for purely selfish reasons. In the long run co-operation is better for each one of us. If the state of war is damaging for all, then rational, self-interested creatures will eventually learn to co-operate.
很理想化的想法。
But,as Hobbes would have been quick to point out, however much evidence there is of co-operation, and however rational co-operation can be, there is still plenty of evidence of competition and exploitation, and this will often seem rational too. And, like the rotten apple, a small measure of anti-social behaviour can spread its evil effects through everything it touches. Fear and suspicion will corrode and wear away a great deal of spontaneous or evolved co-operation.
脆弱的体制下，坏了一锅粥的事情，必然发生。
One response open to the anarchist is to insist that there are no rotten apples. Or at least, in so far as there are, that this is a creation of governments: as Rousseau suggests, we have become softened and corrupted. Anarchists argue that we propose government as the remedy(治疗) to anti-social behaviour, but, in general,governments are its cause. Nevertheless the thought that the state is the source of all forms of strife among human beings seems impossibly hopeful. In fact, the thesis appears to undermine itself. If we are all naturally good, why has such an oppressive and corrupting state come into existence? The most obvious answer is that a few greedy and cunning(狡猾的) individuals, through various disreputable means, have managed to seize power. But then, if such people existed before the state came into being, as they must have done on this theory, it cannot be the case that we are all naturally good. Therefore to rely on the natural goodness of human beings to such an extent seems utopian in the extreme.
乌托邦呀，乌托邦，你永远也来不了。
Hence most thoughtful anarchists have made a different response. The absence of governments does not mean that there can be no forms of social control over individual behaviour. Social pressure, public opinion, fear of a poor reputation, even gossip, can all exert their effects on individual behaviour.Those who behave anti-socially will be ostracized(排斥).
改进的无政府主义观：可以不要政府，但仍存在管理组织。
Furthermore many anarchists have accepted the need for the authority of experts within society. Some people know how best to cultivate food, for instance, and it issensible to defer to their judgement. And within any sizeable group political structures are necessary to co-ordinate behaviour on the medium and large scale. For example, in times of international conflict even an anarchist society needs generals and military discipline. Deference to the opinions ofexperts and obedience to social rules may also be essential in peace time too.
所以说，极端的无政府主义还是难以为继的。
Such rules and structures are said not to amount to states as they allow the individual to opt out(退出): hence they are voluntary in a way no state is. The state claims a monopoly of legitimate political power. No 'voluntarist', anarchist social system would do this.However, the existence of anti-social people who refuse to join in the voluntary society places the anarchist in a dilemma. If the anarchist society refuses to attempt to restrain the behaviour of such people, then it is in danger of falling into severe conflict. But if it enforces social rules agains tsuch people, then, in effect, it has become indistinguishable from a state. In sum, as the anarchist picture of society becomes increasingly realistic and less utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal, democratic, state. In the end, perhaps we simply lack an account of what a peaceful, stable, desirable situation would be in the absence of something very like a state (with the exception of anthropological(人类学的) accounts of small agrarian(农业的) societies).
理论基本已破产。
Yet, anarchism should not be dismissed so quickly. We have seen some of the disadvantages of the state of nature. What about the disadvantages of the state? How rational is it to centralize power inthe hands of the few? We are yet to examine the arguments which have been givento justify the state. If it turns out that these attempts to justify the state do not work, then we will have to take a fresh look at anarchism. And in fact,for just this reason, we will need to raise the subject again.
但仍具思考意义。
Conclusion
I began this chapter with Hobbes's famous depiction of the state of nature as a miserable state of war of all against all. The basic argument is that individuals, motivated by the drive for 'felicity' will inevitably come into conflict over scarce goods, and, in the absence of a sovereign, this conflict will escalate into full-scale war. A number of counter-arguments were made in response. Locke suggested that the state of nature is governed by a moral law which could be enforced by every individual.He supplements this with the claim that we are initially in a condition of abundance, not scarcity, and with an implicit assumption that people will often be directly motivated to follow the moral law. While Rousseau agrees with Locke that Hobbes was wrong to suggest that our natural condition is one of extreme scarcity, he denies that ideas of morality and moral motivation have any place in a state of nature. Instead he proposes that natural pity or compassion will prevent war from breaking out, pointedly remarking that we cannot tell how 'natural man' would behave on the basis of our observations of 'civilized man'.But whatever the force of these responses to Hobbes, both Locke and Rousseau admit that the counteracting causes to war they have identified can only serve to delay the onset of severe conflict, and will not avoid it for ever. The anarchists are more optimistic in their attempts to avoid this conclusion. We considered three main strategies to defend the anarchist position. The first was to argue that co-operation will evolve in the state of nature, even among self-interested creatures. The second was to claim that human beings are naturally good. The third, and most plausible, is the argument that political and social structures and rules, short of the state, can be devised to remedy the defects of the state of nature. Yet, as I suggested, the gap between rational anarchism and the defence of thestate becomes vanishingly small. Inthe end, I think, we must agree with Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Nothing genuinely worthy of being called a state of nature will, at least in the longterm, be a condition in which human beings can flourish. But whether this turnsout to be a 'refutation' of anarchism remains to be seen.
结论就是：霍布斯说的对呀！
愿你憨憨傻傻，难得天真！